13
Missiles Paid for with Other People's Coins
illustrationSanctions have cut North Korea off from almost all the money in the world. Banks will not open correspondent accounts for it, Visa cards are useless in Pyongyang, and whatever the country sells abroad has to be smuggled out. On the other hand, it has mathematics schools that select gifted children from the first grades, and an intelligence service where the best of them are taught to write code. By various estimates, thousands of such programmers work for the state, and, if UN experts are to be believed, their work brings the country about half of all its foreign currency.
In February 2016 someone sent thirty-five payment orders for almost $1 billion from the Central Bank of Bangladesh through the SWIFT network. The money was supposed to move from the Bangladeshi bank’s account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to accounts in Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Most of the transfers were stopped, partly because the recipient’s name in one of the orders was misspelled and the banks grew suspicious. Eighty-one million dollars did go through to the Philippines, dissolved in the casinos of Manila, and almost none of it was ever recovered. Investigators later linked the attack to a group of hackers that security specialists call Lazarus, which works for the government of North Korea.
The old system, for all its flaws, put up resistance. SWIFT has banks at each end, banks have employees who read the orders, and transfers have recipients with names and accounts that can be frozen. To get the stolen money out, they needed shell companies, casinos and living people in the Philippines. A year later the North Korean hackers found a more convenient target.
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